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Introduction: Influences and Echoes of 
Indonesia in Timor-Leste
Since 1999, when a United Nations (UN) 
transitional administration was established in the 
wake of the East Timorese vote for independence 
from Indonesia, the case of Timor-Leste has been a 
relative mainstay in research and policy debates on 
post-conflict reconstruction (Call and Wyeth 2008; 
Hood 2007; Svoboda and Davey 2013). Timor-
Leste is often characterised by scholars as a ‘post-
conflict’ country and, as a consequence, compared 
to other countries that have recently emerged from 
political strife. While this focus is understandable, 
it has also meant that surprisingly little scholarly 
attention has focused on the connections, points 
of similarity and interrelations between Timor-
Leste and its near neighbour and former occupier 
Indonesia. Only recently have researchers begun to 
explore the multiple dimensions of Timor-Leste/
Indonesian relations and unpack the relationship 
across a range of disciplines.
This new and promising research agenda 
is very much in its early stages. This discussion 
paper contributes to this turn to Indonesia in 
the Timor-Leste studies literature by presenting 
four brief case studies that highlight, in different 
ways, how the two countries and peoples remain 
intricately entwined at the social, political, cultural 
and personal levels.1 The cases explore the 
relationship across different scales ranging from the 
institutional to the level of individuals and families; 
they are written by four scholars who approach 
the issue from different disciplinary backgrounds. 
Case study one2 shows how Indonesia is the prime 
reference point for East Timorese police officers 
and how these bonds become strengthened further 
by commercial ties. Case study two3 explores the 
lives of East Timorese women who, during the 
occupation, were coerced into sexual relationships 
with members of the Indonesian military, and who 
continue to encounter stigma and difficulties in 
their newly independent homeland. Case studies 
three and four turn to an examination of the lives 
of tens of thousands of East Timorese who fled 
across the border to Indonesia following the 1999 
referendum. Case study three4 provides a historical 
and cultural perspective on how Tetun-speaking 
East Timorese from the Suai area conceptualise 
the border region. Case study four5 focuses on the 
experiences of former East Timorese refugees in 
Indonesia who have recently crossed the border 
to return home and examines how, in the post-
occupation period, rural lives are being rebuilt with 
minimal state assistance. Before turning to these 
case studies, we first examine how a reductionist 
‘conflict paradigm’ has come to dominate 
scholarship on Timor-Leste, which has meant that 
relatively limited attention has been paid to the 
influences and echoes of Indonesia.
The dominance of the ‘conflict paradigm’
As one scholar of Timor-Leste has noted, the 
small South-East Asian nation serves frequently 
as ‘a cautionary tale or case study for debates 
surrounding post-conflict fragility and the UN 
state-building approach’ (Scambary forthcoming:2). 
Attention has focused mainly on examining (and 
oft-times finding fault with) the development 
and state-building efforts of the UN and bilateral 
donors in Timor-Leste. By way of example, over 
30 articles have been published on 
the topic of police development 
alone; this works out as a ratio 
of one article for every 100 East 
Timorese police officers. Most 
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researchers are working within the frame of ‘post-
conflict studies’ and therefore tend to associate Dili 
more with Juba than Jakarta. As scholarship on 
Timor-Leste accretes, this framing gets set further, 
with researchers building on (and referring to) 
each other’s work, creating something of a path 
dependency. This ‘post-conflict’ definition is also 
embraced enthusiastically by the East Timorese 
Government, most notably through its initiation, 
support and championing of the g7+, a forum for 
fragile and post-conflict states. Large delegations 
of East Timorese politicians and civil society travel 
regularly to places like South Sudan to contribute 
their ‘lessons learned’ to other nations rebuilding 
after conflict.
The focus on international efforts is 
understandable given the size and scale of the 
state-building endeavour in Timor-Leste over the 
past decade. However, it has resulted in a tendency 
to frame Timor-Leste within what Bexley (2010) 
refers to as a ‘conflict paradigm’. This paradigm 
has a number of features. First, it positions East 
Timorese as ‘victims’ of conflict and colours the 
experience of Indonesia as a ‘wholly negative one’ 
(Bexley 2010:9). Second, the conflict paradigm 
examines developments in Timor-Leste through a 
state-centric ‘security-focused’ lens (ibid.). Building 
on Bexley’s framework, we would add that the 
conflict paradigm also views Timor-Leste within an 
ahistorical lens; the nation is seen as a ‘tabula rasa’ 
that began its ‘transition’ to independence following 
the referendum for self-determination in 1999. 
This paradigm is problematic because prioritising 
attention to internationally led state-building and 
peace-building efforts means that less emphasis is 
placed on the extent of East Timorese agency in this 
endeavour. Combined with an ahistorical focus, it 
leaves significant gaps in our understanding about 
other influences on Timor-Leste, including the long 
relationship with Indonesia. For instance, it ignores 
the enormous extent to which the Indonesian 
occupation, although oppressive, has influenced 
social, political and cultural life in Timor-Leste.6
The scholarly lack of attention to the points of 
connection between Timor-Leste and Indonesia is 
somewhat surprising given that, even to the casual 
observer, there are many striking parallels between 
the two nations. The same sorts of minibus taxis 
(made in Surabaya, Indonesia’s second-largest city) 
throng roads in urban areas in Timor-Leste as 
they do beyond the border. Among other points of 
commonality are kindred architectural styles, types 
of popular restaurants and the food served in them, 
as well as the omnipresent whiff of clove cigarettes. 
Police, civil servant and military uniforms are 
practically identikit, perhaps not surprising given 
they are produced in Indonesian factories. The 
yellow lorries ‘that speak of government funded 
construction contracts’ (Pisani 2014:128) are 
ubiquitous in both countries.
Factors such as cultural similarities, the long 
history of engagement between the two nations 
(including the 24-year Indonesian occupation of 
Timor-Leste) and language are all important in 
facilitating close economic, political and people-
to-people ties. One of Indonesia’s largest banks, the 
state-owned Mandiri, is based in Dili. Despite the 
energy reserves in the Timor Sea, all the fuel that 
fills the cars is Indonesian. Most of it is supplied 
by the Indonesian state oil company, a durable and 
commercial success story that operates out of the 
same facilities it built during the occupation and 
whose depot provided the fuel to burn Dili down 
in 1999. Indonesian satellite TV beams into East 
Timorese homes, and the default language for web 
browsers and social media sites is Indonesian. 
There are as many East Timorese undertaking 
higher education in Indonesian universities as there 
are in Dili. Flights between the countries leave on 
a daily basis. According to the last census, many 
more East Timorese speak Indonesian than either 
Portuguese or English. Over 6000 Indonesian 
citizens live in Timor-Leste (KBRI Dili 2013).
In recent years, pragmatic international 
relations between the two governments have also 
played a vital part in binding the countries together. 
Relations between the two countries are remarkably 
warm given their recent pasts. Leaders visit each 
other’s countries often and are feted when they do. 
Timor-Leste was the first country that Indonesian 
President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono visited in 
2005 following his inauguration and also one of 
the last before he stepped down in 2014.7 Timor-
Leste’s prime minister, Xanana Gusmao, is a regular 
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visitor to Indonesia. In October 2014, he received 
Indonesia’s highest medal of honour (Bintang 
Adipura). There are advantages in the close 
relationship for both countries. From Indonesia’s 
side, relationship is significant as evidence that 
a new era of political and democratic reform 
(era reformasi) has been initiated. From Timor-
Leste’s side, the stability of independent nation is 
underwritten by an implicit deal to ‘forgive and 
forget’ Indonesia for crimes committed by its 
military during the occupation.8 Pursuing good 
ties with Indonesia has been a key objective of East 
Timorese governments since independence, which 
have responded to the violence of history as a 
matter requiring reconciliation rather than criminal 
sanctions. It is against this backdrop of complex, 
historically grounded interconnections and tensions 
that the case studies are set.
1. Case Study One: Influences on Policing
The links between Indonesia and Timor-Leste are 
strikingly apparent in the arena of policing and 
in the actions of the 3000-strong Timorese police 
service, the PNTL (Policia Nacional de Timor-Leste). 
There appear to be five areas of relationship and 
similarity: historical–cultural legacies, similarities 
of governmentality, shared methods of policing, the 
ramifications of the pragmatic politics described in 
the previous section and the importance of business 
linkages.
1.1 Historical legacies
The literature on the police development in Timor-
Leste is emblematic of the dominant framing of the 
country within a discourse of conflict and state-
building. Broadly speaking, it alights with only a 
glance at past experiences of policing and order–
maintenance in the territory prior to the arrival 
of the UN, a narrative arc that one commentator 
has likened to ‘historical amnesia’ (Nygaard-
Christensen 2011:10).9 This serves to downplay the 
complex of international influences brought to bear 
upon the development of Timor-Leste’s policing, 
including the two historical occupying powers — 
Portugal and Indonesia.
Most chapters and articles tend to begin in 
1999, when a UN transitional administration 
assumed temporary authority over the territory. 
With the departure of the Indonesian police, 
there was a complete vacuum of formal policing 
and the UN created two new forces to fill it. 
An international police force assumed primary 
responsibility for actual policing, while an 
accelerated plan was made for founding and 
developing a professional, impartial and politically 
neutral indigenous service to take over that 
responsibility. The East Timorese police was 
established on 27 March 2000 and although the 
rhetoric around the new institution was framed 
in terms of blank slates and fresh starts, the ‘new’ 
East Timorese police had a strong Indonesian vein 
running through it.
In order to expedite the development of the 
new institution, the UN decided the backbone 
of the new East Timorese police would be those 
officers who served as police officers in POLRI 
(Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia; the 
Indonesian National Police). The man chosen to be 
the first police commissioner had, prior to 1999, 
been the most senior ranking East Timorese in the 
Indonesian police apparatus. Other colleagues went 
on to fill senior leadership roles. The first head of 
the police’s immigration wing and subsequently the 
director of the police training school was formerly a 
plainclothes intelligence officer (Manianty 2009).
The connections with Indonesia were not just 
emerging through past employment. Younger 
officers were, to a large extent, socialised amid the 
context of an authoritarian Indonesian regime. 
This cohort, commonly known as the jerasaun foun 
(Tetun: new generation) were born and grew up 
during the Indonesian occupation, meaning that 
they were socialised in the occupying country’s 
languages, cultures and means of doing business. 
Although often characterised as a ‘post-conflict’ 
country, it is probably every bit as accurate to think 
of Timor-Leste as a post-authoritarian country, with 
all the implications that has for the introduction of 
a liberal-democratic model of policing.
1.2 Governmentality
Although the Indonesian occupation ended, 
its governmental legacies endure. Like many 
postcolonial states, Timor-Leste has inherited more 
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from its predecessors than nationalist rhetoric 
might suggest. One area in which this similarity 
manifests is in terms of governmentality and a 
mimetic modelling of behaviours. Similarities in 
terms of architecture, uniforms and police insignia 
are striking. By and large, the police stations and 
compounds that the East Timorese police occupy 
are former Indonesia-era buildings. Indonesian-
language slogans and insignia are still very visible.
These reverberations tend to be characterised 
in negative terms. Gunn and Huang (2006:123), 
for example, cite legacies of Jakarta’s occupation 
as including ‘nepotism, favouritism, corruption, 
and bureaucratic inertia’. Blunt (2009:90) suggests 
‘twenty five years of Indonesian occupation have 
left indelible marks on bureaucratic practice and 
public expectation in Timor-Leste’.10 Other authors 
suggest more benign interpretations. Wilson (2010) 
identifies similarities and resonances between 
Timorese and Indonesian approaches to power and 
governance.
Looking further back, Indonesian authoritarian 
approaches to policing built on and reinforced 
Portuguese authoritarian ideas about policing, 
which in turn utilised and reinforced autochthonous 
ideas about ‘policing’ and authority broadly written.
1.3 Police practices
Contemporary Indonesia appears to be emerging 
as the major model of modernity and development 
in many government spheres in Timor-Leste and 
policing is no exception (Nygaard-Christensen 
2013). Beyond the existence of similar uniforms 
and equipment, and the fact that Indonesian 
words are used as police jargon, it would seem that 
Timor-Leste’s neighbour serves as an inspiration 
for behaviour.
Some of this is influenced by television. East 
Timorese police are avid aficionados of ‘cops’ style 
reality television shows beamed in via satellite. 
Professional education also plays a role, with East 
Timorese police regularly travelling across the 
border for training.
Perhaps the most vivid similarities can 
be observed in the ways the East Timorese 
police appear to model behaviour based on the 
paramilitary policing style of the occupation. The 
large-scale police operations appear inspired by 
Indonesia circa the 1990s, and the similarities 
between operations to protect the population from 
(imaginary) bogeymen are striking. From the 
latter part of the 1990s, the East Timorese police 
have engaged regularly in operations that follow a 
similar curvature. The operations begin with vague 
rumours, insinuations and tittle-tattle of threats 
emanating in a far-off part of the country. These 
rumours, spread by text message and social media 
and fanned by the country’s febrile media, then 
require the country’s police to mount an operation 
to charge off and restore calm. The operations 
usually involve the rounding up of a large group 
of people suspected of vague misdeeds, most of 
whom are subsequently released. The operations 
are large ‘proyeks’ (projects), eating up hundreds 
of thousands of dollars in costs for staff overtime, 
fuel and food, and the nod to Indonesia is palpable. 
For example, Operasaun 88, purportedly an effort 
to round up terrorists in a mountainous part of the 
east of the country, was named after the Indonesian 
counter-terrorist unit Delta 88 (Fundasaun 
Mahein 2011).
Perhaps the most famous of these operations 
was the one to tackle an alleged ‘ninja’ menace in 
2010, the evocative name garnering unusually high 
degrees of attention from the international media. 
The term ‘ninja’ in Timor-Leste doesn’t evoke a 
real band of fighters, but a hidden, sometimes 
imaginary menace stalking the country. It came 
into the vernacular in the 1990s, when shadowy 
militias backed by the Indonesian army targeted 
East Timorese independence activists. Villages were 
terrorised and East Timorese were believed to be 
kidnapped and killed in the dark by men garbed in 
black (Myrttinen 2013).
1.4 The impact of pragmatic politics on policing
Pragmatic politics have reverberated in terms 
of policing, with the tendency to prioritise 
relationships over tasks. This was most apparent 
in the case of Maternus Bere, a former militia 
commander caught by the Timorese police and 
subsequently released by Timorese authorities, 
allegedly under intense pressure from the 
Indonesian Government.
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More than 400 Timorese are indicted for 
serious crimes that took place in the run-up to and 
the aftermath of the vote for independence. Many 
of them are living in plain sight in Indonesia, and 
most are just over the border in West Timor. The 
problem of what to do with former leaders such as 
Maternus Bere is something that both governments 
prefer to keep in the background. With Bere’s 
arrest, the matter became front-page news; the 
drama played out with world attention on the 
country, as it coincided with the tenth anniversary 
of the vote for independence. The decision to free 
Bere prompted outrage from opposition parties, 
civil society and human rights non-government 
organisations (NGOs). It even drew an unusually 
direct reproach from the normally anxious not-
to-offend UN mission, which accused the East 
Timorese Government of trading victims’ rights for 
peaceable relations. The incident also showed up 
the limits of the police’s independence sovereignty. 
In arresting Bere, the East Timorese police had, in 
many ways, performed in a professional manner 
but this was trumped by political considerations.
1.5 Business ties
Another facet of the relationship concerns 
business ties. Indonesian business dominates the 
marketplace across all sectors. Given the extent of 
Indonesia business interests in Dili, the Timorese 
capital city is awash with the Indonesian language 
in terms of private sector advertising. During 
2013, Timor-Leste exported US$181 million to 
Indonesia (in return for goods which came in 
through reported customs channels), according to 
monthly trade reports from Timor-Leste’s General 
Directorate for Statistics. Over the past three years, 
Timor-Leste’s total imports of services were about 
50 per cent larger than total goods imports, and 
a significant part of this would have come from 
Indonesia as well.
This plays out in a number of obvious ways 
in policing. When refurbishments are done to 
Indonesian-era police posts, it is often Indonesian 
contractors who do the work. Indonesian 
companies produce uniforms for the Timorese 
police, often according to similar couture. Guns, 
communications equipment, trucks and assorted 
policing paraphernalia are sourced from Indonesian 
factories. Seeing senior East Timorese police 
officers in Dili hotels being wined and dined 
by Indonesian business people is a reasonably 
common occurrence. Some Timorese officers 
and civil servants post photos on their personal 
Facebook pages of trying on expensive kit at Jakarta 
warehouses.
Some of the deals that are reported seem 
to result in pretty lousy products, often bought 
according to inexplicable and hidden off-budget 
payment schedules. However, when allegations of 
some deals have emerged, they appear to disclose 
close relationships between Indonesian businesses 
and Timorese politicians. For example, in 2012, a 
scandal erupted in Dili following disclosure of a 
commercial deal between the Timorese police chief 
and an Indonesian arms company for the supply of 
assault weapons.
1.6 Conclusion
Although much has been written about the 
police of Timor-Leste in the past decade and a 
half, scholars have rarely tied the political and 
governmental cultures of the new country with that 
of the countries that formerly ruled over it, one of 
which is its near neighbour. Instead, the focus has 
been on comparing the new country with other 
states and territories emerging from conflict and/
or favoured with large international peacekeeping 
presences.
The point is not that Timor-Leste mimics or 
wants to be, Indonesia. It is, however, to suggest 
that, to understand Timor-Leste, one must look 
to its strong Indonesian influences. Indonesia is 
far from the only source of inspiration for the 
current attitudes, posture, trajectory and style of the 
Timorese police but it is perhaps more significant 
than has been considered previously.
2. Case Study Two: The Legacy of Coercive 
Sexual Relationships During the Occupation
The enduring nature of ties between Indonesia 
and Timor-Leste can also be observed in the realm 
of intimate personal relationships. Indonesian 
and East Timorese men and women were, not 
surprisingly, entangled in many different kinds 
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of personal relationships during the 24-year 
occupation involving varying degrees of consent. 
This case study is concerned specifically with 
the highly coercive, non-consensual, sexual 
relationships that were formed between East 
Timorese women and members of the Indonesian 
armed forces. These relationships, although 
widespread during the occupation, are rarely 
spoken about in independent Timor-Leste, in 
part because of the deep social and cultural 
stigma associated with them (CAVR 2005: 
Chapter 7.7:5).11 By and large, women who have 
survived such relationships are perceived as 
sexually ‘defiled’; they do not fit within prevailing 
nationalist discourse which celebrates women’s 
sexual purity and their roles as mothers (Kent and 
Kinsella 2014).
In 2011, an exploratory research study aimed 
to shed light on the sociopolitical circumstances 
that led East Timorese women to enter into 
relationships with the Indonesian military and to 
consider the ongoing impact of these experiences 
in their lives.12 In-depth interviews were conducted 
with 19 East Timorese women who had been 
coerced into relationships of this nature. Below is 
an overview of the key themes that emerged from 
the women’s accounts. These themes are then 
examined with a view to highlighting how more 
research on the complexities and ongoing legacies 
of these relationships is needed.
2.1 Narratives of the conflict: coercion and 
complicity
Many of the women interviewed for this study 
began their accounts of their lives by discussing 
the circumstances in which they first came into 
contact with the Indonesian military. It seemed 
that, for most women, this had occurred during the 
early years of the Indonesian occupation, between 
1975 and the early 1980s. It was during this period 
that, under the strain of military onslaught, many 
civilians were captured or surrendered after coming 
down from the mountains where they had been 
sheltering behind FALINTIL (Armed Forces for 
the National Liberation of East Timor) lines. Most 
women had been very young at the time — the 
majority were only teenagers. Some described how 
they were transferred to military posts after their 
surrender or capture. Others were approached 
directly in their homes, where parents and other 
family members were described as having little 
choice other than to allow their daughters to 
‘marry’ Indonesian military officers.
Women were coerced into a range of different 
kinds of relationships. In some cases, a member 
of the security forces lived with a woman and 
her family on a permanent basis or visited 
them regularly in their homes. Another kind of 
coercive relationship involved women being held 
permanently in military installations or houses 
rented by the military in a manner similar to 
‘comfort women’.13 These women became the sexual 
‘property’ of one man or a number of men. In other 
cases, women were not physically detained but 
were summoned regularly to military barracks for 
sexual purposes and were considered the property 
of a military unit. A number of respondents had 
endured consecutive coercive relationships as 
sexual ownership was passed from one military 
battalion to its replacement. The length of time 
women remained in sexual relationships also 
varied. In some cases, the relationships lasted only 
for several months, while in others they continued 
for a number of years.14
When describing why they believed they 
had been targeted, a number of women stressed 
their involvement in, or links to, the resistance 
movement. Some women had played active roles in 
organisations such as OPMT (Popular Organisation 
of East Timorese Women), acting as cooks, couriers 
and intelligence for the armed front. Others had 
male family members who had joined FALINTIL. 
The specific targeting of women with resistance 
connections suggests that sexual violence was used 
as a strategy by the Indonesian military to weaken 
and destroy those who opposed the Indonesian 
occupation (see also CAVR 2005: Chapter 7.7:108).
Another striking theme in women’s stories was 
that East Timorese men (and sometimes women) 
were often mentioned as complicit in their abusive 
treatment. A number of women spoke of the role 
of East Timorese members of the Indonesian 
army and its auxiliary groups, including civil 
defence groups, as well as government officials 
ips.cap.anu.edu.au/ssgm                                                                                                 7 
SSGM Discussion Paper 2014/8
such as district administrators and village chiefs, 
in facilitating their handover to the Indonesian 
security forces, or ‘keeping watch’ while they were 
raped. Some also spoke of how East Timorese men 
committed rape and sexual violence against them. 
The research team was also told of how, in some 
cases, family members or community leaders had 
conceded women to enter into relations with the 
Indonesian military in exchange for security for the 
village or family.
When talking about their past experiences, 
women focused not only on the sexual and physical 
abuse they had endured, but on ‘everyday’ and 
psychological forms of violence. Some described 
being locked in houses and barracks and prevented 
from leaving, and spoke of the loneliness and 
social isolation that came with being taken far 
away from their families. Women also described 
how they were expected to cook and clean, and 
attend to other domestic duties. Not surprisingly, 
experiences of pregnancy, and struggles to feed and 
care for babies featured prominently in women’s 
accounts of their lives.
Despite their undeniably coercive beginnings, it 
was clear that for some women, these relationships 
had also provided them with a limited form of self-
protection. Entering into them was sometimes part 
of an attempt by women to protect their family 
members and their own reputations. That is, for 
some women, entering into an arrangement with 
one military officer could be seen as a preferable 
option to remaining vulnerable to ongoing rapes 
from multiple men and being marked by their 
community members as ‘whores’. It was also 
apparent from women’s accounts that not all the 
military officers involved treated them with the 
same degree of disrespect. At times, individual 
army officers even showed acts of kindness towards 
women. In one case, a relationship resulted in 
a formal church marriage, after the couple had 
a number of children together, although this 
marriage dissolved after the 1999 post-referendum 
violence when the woman’s husband returned to 
Indonesia.
Women’s stories about their past experiences 
help to illuminate the messiness of the Indonesian 
occupation. They show, for instance, how 
violence permeated everyday life and fostered 
the pervasive militarisation of society. They also 
illuminate the specifically gendered consequences 
of this militarisation by showing how the violent 
militarised masculine identities produced during 
the occupation intersected with and exacerbated 
pre-existing unequal gender relations. Within the 
oppressive circumstances of the occupation, the 
security concerns of families and communities 
could be valued more highly than the welfare 
of individual women, and young women could 
thus be sacrificed. The militarisation of everyday 
life also created opportunities for East Timorese 
men to engage in violence, both to prove their 
loyalty to the Indonesian military and for more 
opportunistic reasons.
At the same time, women’s narratives revealed 
that although they entered into these arrangements 
in highly constrained circumstances, there was 
a great diversity among their experiences and, 
for some women, there was a limited space to 
negotiate and manoeuvre. Within the constrained 
circumstances of the conflict, and their unequal 
position within East Timorese society, women 
improvised, negotiated and made calculations 
based on how best to protect their families, their 
reputations and their bodies.
2.2 Reconstructing lives amid continuing violence
Although the women interviewed were prepared 
to speak about their past experiences, their main 
preoccupation was their ongoing, everyday 
struggle to rebuild their lives. Concerns such as 
feeding their families and educating their children 
were foremost in their minds. The women we 
interviewed had had little formal education and 
most appeared to be living in a state of economic 
precariousness, many with limited support from 
extended family members.
Compounding these difficulties is the stigma 
associated with these women’s experiences, a stigma 
reflected in the labels of ‘whore’ and ‘TNI wife’ that 
are sometimes affixed to them by community and 
family members. Those who remain unmarried, 
particularly those with children fathered to the 
Indonesian military, appear to occupy a particularly 
marginalised and ambiguous position, as they 
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can claim neither ‘wife’ nor ‘widow’ status. Some 
explained that they felt such a deep sense of 
shame they felt unable to marry a Timorese man. 
Many also appeared to have limited information 
about the services available to them, including 
the Bolsu de Maie scheme that provides modest 
financial assistance to female-headed households 
with children.15 Some expressed a reluctance to 
go to church or participate in other community 
activities. None of the women we interviewed had 
any ongoing contact with, or assistance from, their 
former ‘husbands’. The extent to which women felt 
stigmatised was also reflected in their concerns 
about protecting their children. Many told the 
research team they did not want to discuss their 
children’s paternity with them for fear that they 
would be discriminated against or that they would 
pass their grievance on to the next generation. 
For many of those interviewed, the violence that 
occurred in the past was understood as continuing; 
it is embedded in ongoing interactions with family 
and community members and in the denial of 
opportunities that would enable them to live as 
respected women.
Despite their economic and social marginalisa-
tion, the women interviewed for this study were 
also acutely conscious of the unfairness of the 
stigma attached to them. Many expressed views 
that they had sacrificed their bodies to save their 
families and communities. Some also sought to 
emphasise the roles they had played within the 
resistance movement against the Indonesian occu-
pation and gave lengthy descriptions of how they 
had contributed, for example, by hiding resistance 
fighters in their homes or smuggling provisions or 
messages to them in the jungle. In the context of 
the interview encounter, if not within the public 
sphere, they insisted on their innocence and social 
worth and sought to reinscribe their experiences as 
a legitimate part of the nation’s story. It was also the 
case that not all the women interviewed remained 
in a tenuous, marginalised position. Those who had 
been able to remarry appeared to have been able to 
re-enter socially acceptable life and defuse the stig-
ma with which they had been tainted, even if they 
were not able to speak of their past experiences 
with their husbands and children.
2.3 Conclusion
Many of the key themes that emerged during 
this study resonate with the comprehensive 
account of ‘sexual violence’ and ‘sexual slavery’ 
during the occupation that is contained within 
the final report of Timor-Leste’s Commission for 
Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR 2005, 
especially Chapter 7.7). Like the CAVR report, this 
exploratory study illustrates how the violence of 
the Indonesian occupation played out in specific 
gendered ways. Yet, close attention to women’s 
narratives also indicates that these 19 women 
should not simply be categorised as victims of 
sexual violence or sexual slavery. This terminology 
does not fully capture these women’s roles within 
the resistance struggle nor their attempts to 
negotiate their relationships to protect themselves 
or their families. Nor does it give enough attention 
to the ways in which violence against women 
was exacerbated by deeply embedded structural 
inequalities within East Timorese society that made 
it possible for young women to be ‘sacrificed’ in 
exchange for community security and later blamed 
for their experiences. Finally, it does not capture 
women’s ongoing attempts to rebuild their lives and 
protect their children amid continuing stigma.
All of this suggests that there remains a need 
for more multidimensional accounts of personal 
relationships between Indonesians and East 
Timorese men and women. While it is important 
to acknowledge the overwhelmingly oppressive 
context in which all of these relationships took 
hold and were sustained during the occupation, 
close attention to these entanglements might 
also complicate the story of ‘sexual slavery’ and 
‘sexual violence’ documented by CAVR. Close 
attention to the lived experiences of women and 
men involved in intimate relationships — from the 
coercive to the less coercive end of the spectrum 
— might, for instance, help to shed light on the 
ways that ordinary men and women navigated 
and survived the occupation using various forms 
of ingenuity. It might also highlight the diversity 
of these relationships, show how women and men 
negotiated them, and help to shed light on their 
intergenerational legacies. These accounts are 
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important not only because they contribute to the 
historical record but because by enabling those 
whose experiences have been marginalised to ‘claim 
space in the imaginings of the nation’ (McEwen 
2003:756) they might also help to contribute 
to a more inclusive vision of East Timorese 
national identity.
3. Case Study Three: Cultural Perspectives 
on Displacement and Mobility among the 
Timorese
3.1 Introduction
As CAVR has observed ‘most individual East 
Timorese alive today have experienced at least one 
period of displacement. Many have experienced 
several’ (CAVR 2005:73). One of the most 
significant periods of displacement occurred in 
early September 1999 when, soon after the UN 
announced that an overwhelming majority of 
the population (78 per cent) had rejected special 
autonomy within Indonesia (which was an effective 
rejection of continued Indonesian control over 
their territory), a stream of refugees left Timor-
Leste, many of them coerced into joining the militia 
exodus. By late 1999, an estimated 250,000 East 
Timorese had fled into the neighbouring half of 
the island, West Timor, part of the province of East 
Nusa Tenggara, Indonesia (CAVR 2005:85).
There have been various attempts to generally 
identify the East Timorese who left and then 
decided to stay in Indonesia after the 1999 
referendum. They have been variously labelled 
as pengungsi (refugee/IDPs) or eks pengungsi 
(ex-refugee) or warga baru (new citizens). These 
labels, however, provide little understanding of 
the ways East Timorese in Indonesia negotiate 
and maintain their relationships with their 
families across the national boundaries. Of all 
the Indonesian regions to which East Timorese 
migrated after the referendum, West Timor 
presented the most immediately attractive 
destination. Geographically, it is the closest place to 
seek temporary refuge. Yet, there is another reason 
why West Timor was a compelling destination 
for the displaced Tetun-speaking people from 
Timor-Leste; the western part of the island has 
deep cultural and historical significance. This 
case study focuses on cultural ideas of mobility 
among the Tetun-speaking people of south-western 
Timor-Leste.16 An underlying objective is to 
examine how those who live in this area perceive 
their displacement and cross-border movement. 
An understanding of the cultural ideologies that 
straddle national territorial boundaries is crucial for 
strengthening future relationships between Timor-
Leste and Indonesia.
3.2 The recognition of origin in Wehali
Among the Tetun-speaking people on both sides 
of the island of Timor is a narrative of collective 
origin that revolves around the central position 
of Wehali.17 Now part of a small unremarkable-
looking town just south of the city of Atambua, 
Wehali was, for a long time, a site of great power. 
Historically, Wehali’s great influence on both sides 
of Timor was exemplified as long ago as 1756 in 
the Contract of Paravicini which was signed by the 
Dutch and the rulers of Timor, and its surrounding 
islands (Roti, Savu, Sumba and Solor). In this 
document, the sovereign ruler of Wehali of Timor, 
Hiacijntoe Corea, signed on behalf of the Timorese 
population across 29 domains. More than half of 
these domains were located in present-day East 
Timor, including Liquica, Manatuto, Kova Lima, 
Same, Bobonaro and Ermera, signalling that the 
putative realm of Wehali in the past extended over 
a large area of both West Timor and East Timor 
(Therik 2004:57).
While this evidence depicts an image of the 
central power of Wehali, there is a considerable lack 
of consensus about the way its authority operated. 
Two major political disruptions that occurred 
within Wehali territory may have played a role 
in this situation. The first was reported in 1642, 
when the Portuguese fidalgo (nobleman) Francisco 
Fernandez led a small troop of men from their 
newly established settlement and trading post in 
Lifao, present-day Oecussi, and attacked Wehali 
centre, burning it to the ground. This event had 
major symbolic significance, with many constituent 
Timorese domains distancing themselves from 
Wehali and realigning their allegiances towards the 
Portuguese (Boxer 1947; Hägerdal 2012).
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A second disruption occurred two and a half 
centuries later when, in 1906, as part of the Dutch 
coercive pacification efforts in the western part 
of the island, an extensive military campaign was 
launched across the area and eventually took 
control over Wehali territory.
These ‘incursions upon Wehali’ (Francillon 
1980) may have diminished its political power but, 
centuries on, Wehali’s influence across the island 
persists. For instance, in early 2000, after the flood 
that swept across most of Wehali land and took 
the lives of many displaced East Timorese, elders 
and representatives from different East Timorese 
communities in West Timor came and offered their 
tributes to the Wehali sacred house of earth and 
sky (ai lotuk) in the village of Laran. For the East 
Timorese living in West Timor the flood was more 
than a natural phenomenon. It was a symbolic 
representation of Wehali spiritual authority over 
the land they were settling. It was this spiritual 
authority that they hoped to capture from Wehali, 
as their land of origin, a symbolic category that will 
accommodate and reconcile them in Wehali land.
Adopting a historical and cultural lens when 
considering recent East Timorese displacement and 
emplacement in Wehali land is important. It helps 
to show that the 1999 displacement of the Tetun 
people from Suai into West Timor follows a similar 
journey to that set by their predecessors.
3.3 Origin and unity among the Tetun people
In 1999, around 500 households from the Fohoterin 
area of Suai arrived in Wehali, West Timor. Unlike 
other areas where displaced East Timorese were 
camped in temporary barracks, the displaced 
Tetun of Fohoterin origin knew where to go to 
seek accommodation. Their destination was 
Sukabiwedik, a hamlet in the village of Kamanasa. 
Kamanasa comprises seven hamlets and is named 
in remembrance of people from Suai-Camanasse in 
Timor-Leste who took refuge in Wehali land during 
the anti-tax rebellion of 1912 (Therik 2004:85).
Thus, just like their predecessors, local people 
welcomed the arrival of these displaced Tetun 
people of Fohoterin origin and accommodated 
them in local people’s houses. ‘Because we are 
coming from one origin’ is the common phrase 
expressed by the local people to describe their 
basis of support. It was this shared origin that has 
also led the local people to offer their land for the 
incoming East Timorese to settle. From the Wehali 
perspective, land is an appropriate gift from the 
female centre. The idea that land has a unifying 
influence among Tetun people is culturally encoded 
as an inevitable consequence of the symbolic 
representation of Wehali as the land of origin (rai 
hun). In Wehali, the concept of rai hun extends 
well beyond the areas around their ritual centre 
in the village of Laran. In another categorical 
sense, rai hun is perceived as the place of the light 
(rai kroman) and the earth itself (rai klaran) and 
therefore extends without limit (Fox 2006:247; 
Therik 2004:71). In a complementary way, Suai is 
ritually expressed as the land of the darkness (rai 
kukun), the land of the dead (rai matebian). As the 
narrative goes:
Wehali: Atu simu ema moris iha rai klaran 
Accept the living people in the bright land
Suai: Atu simu ema mate rai kukun 
Accept the dead people in the dark land.
The idea of unity between the Tetun people 
from Suai and the Tetun people of Wehali is also 
conceptualised in the symbolic representation 
of Wehali as Suai’s source of prosperity. Another 
narrative about the living ritual of Nai Loro 
Nubatak, one of the mythical rulers of Suai, 
exemplifies this relationship:
One time during his leadership, Nai Loro 
Nubatak was very keen to make a ritual 
to offer thanks to God for the goodness 
extended upon the people of Suai. The 
essential instruments to conduct this ritual 
were betel and areca nut (bua abut). Betel and 
areca nut, however, were not found in Suai 
area at that time so Nai Loro Nubatak made 
an appeal to Liurai Wehali to provide the 
seeds of betel from Wesei (Takan Wesei Oan) 
to be planted in Suai.
Liurai Wehali approved the request and gave 
the betel seeds delivered by a couple from 
Wehali. The name of the man was Klau 
Firak and the woman, Dahu Firak. This 
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couple lived among the Suai people and 
together they planted the betel and areca 
nut in Weafou, Mota Masin and Wetaeboko. 
(Damaledo, fieldwork notes 2013)
Here the sense of unity between Suai and 
Wehali and the nature of their relationship is 
symbolically expressed as seedbed and plantation. 
As elsewhere in eastern Indonesia, betel and areca 
nut are the essential elements of ritual in Wehali. 
The expression Takan Wesei Oan refers in ritual 
terms to the heir of the domain, the son of the 
liurai, the one who holds the authority. Thus, 
the association of Wehali as the source of betel 
and areca nut implies the central role of Wehali 
in the ritual life of the Tetun-speaking people in 
Suai, symbolically the source of life. As Wehali 
maintained spiritual authority, Suai is perceived 
as their cultivated land, the land that can grow 
and prosper.
The shared recognition of Wehali as land of 
origin confirms an imagined unified identity as one 
people for both the Tetun-speakers from Timor-
Leste and those in West Timor. This, at the same 
time, legitimises the Tetun-speaking people from 
Timor-Leste’s claims to belonging in West Timor 
by articulating their displacement culturally as a 
process of returning to one’s land of origin.
3.4 Return and return (again)
The origin narrative depicts the Tetun-speaking 
people who left Suai (inside the Timor-Leste 
border) for the Wehali land in West Timor as 
‘returnees’. This does not mean that they have been 
completely detached from Suai. For them, Wehali, 
with its representation as the mother and the father, 
the female and the centre, the land of origin and 
the earth, means Wehali accommodates but does 
not constrain, embraces but does not confine, and 
receives but also gives away. The idea is based on a 
different narrative in Wehali which conceptualises 
mobility as the key characteristic of the Tetun 
people. Mobility in Tetun narratives is categorised 
symbolically as the departure of Wehali’s men to 
the land of the morning sun and the land of the 
setting sun:
Na’i Taek Malaka married Hoa’r Na’i Haholek 
and had six boys and one girl.
The first born was Na’i Saku Mataus, then 
Na’i Bara Mataus, Na’i Ura Mataus, Na’i Meti 
Mataus, Na’i Neno Mataus, Na’i Leki Mataus.
The last born was a girl named Ho’ar 
Mataus, entitled Ho’ar Makbalin Balin Liurai 
(literally Ho’ar, the one who was in charge of 
appointing rulers — liurai).
Na’i Saku Mataus and Na’i Bara Mataus were 
given away to sit in the land of the rising sun. 
(Therik 2004:81–82)
For many Tetun people from Suai, moreover, 
the narrative serves as a foundation for their return 
to their land in Suai. And this is what happened 
regarding the displaced people of Fohoterin origin 
who now live in Sukabiwedik, West Timor. With the 
warm reception and the land gift they received from 
the Tetun people, one would have expected that this 
group of displaced people would eventually settle in 
Sukabiwedik. However, in late 1999, 400 households 
decided to return to Suai. Between 2001 and 2003 
another 20 households decided to return. Today, 
only around 40 households remain in Sukabiwedik. 
For these people, Wehali has always been home 
but another home should also be looked after. The 
people of Suai origin who have decided to stay in 
Wehali land commonly describe the decision of 
others to return to Timor-Leste in the following 
way: ‘We encouraged them to return because if 
everyone stays here, who is going maintain the path 
of our ancestors and maintain the house and the 
land in Suai?’
3.5 Conclusion
In the introduction of his discussion on the 
conception of land and territories among the 
Austronesian people, Reuter (2006:14) argues that 
‘no matter how much displacement they might 
experience, their relationships with the land, their 
place of origin and their place of residence are 
matters of utmost importance to all people, and 
no less so to a people on the move’. This statement 
is exemplified by the shared recognition of origin 
among the (displaced) Tetun-speaking people 
from Timor-Leste and those they describe as their 
‘brothers and sisters’ in West Timor. This has led 
to a supportive process of emplacement in West 
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Timor and, for those who have decided to return 
to Timor-Leste, a supportive repatriation process. 
The narrative of shared origin has also facilitated 
various kinds of life cycle and religious rituals (e.g. 
birth, marriage, death, reconstruction of ancestral 
sacred house) that have involved people from both 
sides of the border. In this process, population 
mobility is celebrated, and accommodated. In their 
ritual expression, the Tetun-speaking people always 
say: ‘ita ema nu’u dei nehe tau malu // nu’u nehek 
tau malu dalan lakotu’ (‘we are like ants, moving 
back and forth but we always remain as one’).
In their attempts to support such mobility, the 
governments of Indonesia and Timor-Leste have 
agreed to implement a regime of cross-border 
passes (pas lintas batas/PLB) in nine locations 
along the border. This enables a flexible and cheap 
means of crossing the border without a passport. 
But East Timorese who have decided to stay in 
West Timor are not only living along the border. 
As the next case study demonstrates, the idea of 
mobility is shared among the East Timorese who, 
after the 1999 referendum, were displaced to the 
West Timor district capital of Kupang. Because 
they are located some 300 kilometres from the 
border, however, these people do not have the same 
privileges as the Tetun-speaking people who reside 
in the border areas.
4. Case Study Four: Repatriation and Cross-
Border Movement in a Timorese Village
Extending upon the themes raised in the previous 
case study, this case considers the repatriation to 
their former homeland of some East Timorese who 
were forcibly displaced to West Timor. Despite the 
large East Timorese refugee diaspora who have 
resettled in Indonesia since 1999, there is a small 
but continued trend of repatriation to Timor-
Leste. In September 2012, the return of six families 
at the border crossing between West Timor and 
Timor-Leste was observed. In August 2013, these 
families were retraced back to their origin village 
of Caicua in the eastern subdistrict of Vemasse 
in order to observe how they were reintegrating 
into their origin community and how they were 
rebuilding livelihoods. Drawing on local accounts 
of displacement, return, and ongoing cross-border 
movement, this case study presents a microcosm 
of the broader trend of informal repatriation that 
is taking place across Timor-Leste after 13 years of 
national independence. Importantly, the continued 
return process highlights the long-term impacts 
of conflict whereby people are still searching for 
stability in their lives, as well as the enduring social 
ties that traverse national and political boundaries. 
It is argued here that the governments of both 
countries should recognise the interconnectedness 
and flows of their diasporic communities.
4.1 Introduction
Early in the morning of 28 September 2012, 
volunteers at the East Timorese NGO Fila Hikas 
Knua (Working Group to Bring Them Home) 
travelled to Mota Ain, the official northern 
coast border crossing post between Timor-Leste 
and West Timor, Indonesia. Six families were 
repatriating to their origin village in Vemasse 
subdistrict following 13 years of residence in 
West Timor.18 The returnees left their West 
Timor residence in Naibonat in Kupang district 
a day earlier to travel to Atambua district, before 
reaching the Mota Ain border around noon the 
following day. They were accompanied by CIS-
Timor (Centre for Internally Displaced Peoples’ 
Services), an Indonesian humanitarian organisation 
that provided emergency relief to East Timorese 
refugees in 1999 following the post-referendum 
vote for national independence which displaced 
nearly a quarter of the East Timorese population 
into West Timor. CIS-Timor continues to give 
social assistance to the so-called ‘ex-refugees’ from 
Timor-Leste who have resettled as new citizens in 
Indonesia.
Fila Hikas Knua is composed of volunteers 
coming together through the strong network 
established among East Timorese civil society 
groups. They have worked collaboratively with 
CIS-Timor since 2010 to assist East Timorese 
families separated by the 1999 conflict through 
a messenger program and, associated with it, the 
voluntary repatriation of East Timorese to their 
former homeland. They connect separated family 
members by delivering letters and video messages. 
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Commonly, returnees decide to repatriate after 
reconnecting with family members, and making 
subsequent trips to their origin village. Both NGOs 
work with minimal funding from the Timor-
Leste and Indonesian governments, running on 
tight budgets to organise the necessary logistics 
involved in each repatriation trip (which costs up 
to US$3000). To date, they have repatriated nearly 
180 East Timorese.19
The official procedure involved in voluntary 
repatriation is led almost entirely by these two 
organisations and local government authorities 
in West Timor and Timor-Leste. Returnees must 
first surrender their Indonesian citizenship, which 
requires an official declaration from the local 
district and provincial authorities. Correspondingly, 
the village chiefs in Timor-Leste receiving the 
returnees must endorse an official statement 
acknowledging their return and guaranteeing their 
safety upon repatriation and reintegration into 
the village.
Due to the limited NGO funding available at 
both ends, the six returnee families (18 individuals 
in total) had access to one construction truck 
on which they packed many of their belongings, 
which importantly included a large statue of the 
Virgin Mary. There was a flurry of activity at the 
border checkpoint as returnees unloaded their 
belongings from the first truck onto a second 
truck hired by Fila Hikas Knua, which then took 
returnees back to their origin village of Caicua. 
The oldest returnee was an elderly woman attired 
in black. She was crouched on the ground looking 
distressed, with one hand tightly gripped onto a 
small wooden coffin. The coffin contained the 
remains of her husband who had passed away in 
2009. Since there was limited space on the trucks, 
she was asked to find a smaller coffin that would 
fit. She later explained that the local tradition of her 
ethnolinguistic group — Wai’mua, which was also 
that of her husband’s — was to bury the body of the 
deceased in their birthplace. Hence, her husband’s 
remains were exhumed from a Naibonat grave to 
be reburied according to Wai’mua ritual in Caicua. 
There were furthermore younger returnees, notably 
two newborn babies, and six youths aged between 4 
and 15. The youths spoke Indonesian and Wai’mua 
but they did not comprehend Tetun, the national 
lingua franca of Timor-Leste. For these youths, 
Indonesia had been considered ‘home’ until now.
After signing the immigration papers, passing 
through police and customs clearance, and having 
a light meal, returnees carried on the next leg of 
their homeward journey. The returnees, volunteers 
and drivers arrived in the administrative capital 
Dili, where they rested after battling nearly three 
hours of torrential rain. The group then travelled 
homeward to Caicua village in the middle of the 
night. Finally, they reached Caicua around midnight 
where they were warmly welcomed by relatives. The 
family of the deceased man had the opportunity to 
mourn for their loss and show respect to the dead.
Almost a year later, in August 2013, the six 
returned families were traced to Caicua to learn 
more about their experiences of displacement 
to West Timor and life since repatriation. The 
narratives told by these families revealed that 
they fled during the violence of September 1999 
due to fear of a backlash against pro-integration 
supporters. Despite residing in Naibonat for over 
a decade, they had limited livelihood resources 
and access to land to carve out a viable living. 
Upon repatriation, families are presently restoring 
livelihoods with minimal state assistance.
4.2 Flight
The six families fled Caicua village separately on 
9 September 1999 fearing an outbreak of violence 
after the announcement of ballot results in which 
78 per cent of East Timorese voted for national 
independence. According to respondents, they were 
not threatened to leave their homes, but followed 
their family members who worked in some capacity 
for the Indonesian security forces. Damaledo 
(2009:24) describes this category of refugees as 
those who are ‘guilty by association’ since they were 
not members of militias, the Indonesian police force 
or the military, but comprised family members 
and relatives of militias and the Indonesian 
security forces.
At the time of fleeing, the majority of 
respondents had only the clothes that they were 
wearing. They were flown out on Indonesian 
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military aircraft from Baucau. Anita, a female 
respondent relayed, ‘I did not know where we 
were heading. Cuba? Portugal? We did not have 
anything with us. We just went.’ A male respondent, 
Eduardo, explained that in 1999 he simply followed 
his elder brother who was a high-ranked military 
officer under the Indonesian regime. Their 
destination was Kupang, where respondents were 
loaded onto military trucks and taken to army 
barrack grounds that became temporary refugee 
camps. In Kupang, the initial months after arrival 
were dire. One female respondent who was aged 12 
at the time recalled, ‘we resided opposite the 
Tuapukan Church. Every day we could see the dead 
being carried past. Maybe five persons each day.’
The UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Red 
Cross and Indonesian Government provided relief 
efforts in the initial years. Respondents resettled 
close to one another in Naibonat, spatialising and 
re-emplacing their origin community away from 
‘home’. Respondents had a brother, uncle or father 
who worked in the Indonesian military or police 
force; as such, they were given public housing 
on army grounds before Indonesian authorities 
requested them to resettle elsewhere. Most of them 
negotiated land access from landowners in West 
Timor to reside and cultivate. In fact, respondents 
described the physical environment in Naibonat 
as similar to Caicua; in both places they depended 
on agriculture.
4.3 Return
There were a number of reasons cited by 
respondents for repatriation. These included the 
desire to reunite with family members, secure 
better access to land and resources, and return to 
one’s birthplace.
Eduardo stated that his brother continues 
to receive social assistance and an Indonesian 
Government pension since he was a retired 
military officer. Meanwhile, Eduardo worked in the 
gardens and kitchens to earn an income for his own 
family. In 2008, he married a West Timorese and 
they had two daughters. Eduardo’s mother became 
ill in 2010, and he made several trips to visit her. 
Finally, he decided to return with his family to take 
care of her. His mother died five months after his 
repatriation. Eduardo relayed that although he was 
thankful he was able to have nursed his mother, 
the everyday struggle to earn money from crops 
since returning has not diminished, particularly 
because he was still waiting for his first crop 
harvest. Moreover, he had saved enough money to 
invest in only one pig and two chickens. Another 
male respondent, Joao, whose uncle retired from 
the military, similarly decided to return because his 
parents were growing old and they needed extra 
hands to raise their livestock.
Since respondents were not direct beneficiaries 
of the Indonesian Government’s public servant 
pension schemes or forms of social assistance 
(such as those described in the previous case 
study), life in the new country was difficult. Most 
respondents relied on agriculture as their main 
source of income, and found it difficult to secure 
land for cultivation from local landowners. They 
either worked as labourers, sharecroppers or earned 
minimal income from growing crops on small plots 
of land they could access. However, upon return, 
they had access to inherited rice fields and gardens 
which their relatives maintained claims over, while 
returnees were residing in Indonesia.
A number of the older respondents stated 
that Timor-Leste was their birthplace and that 
they wanted to contribute to the rebuilding of the 
country and die where they belonged. The second 
generation born and raised in Naibonat were swiftly 
learning Tetun in school. However, the oldest boy, 
now aged 16, had dropped out of secondary school 
because he could not keep up with learning the 
Portuguese language.
In the first month after their return, Timor-
Leste’s Ministry of Social Solidarity provided two 
sacks of rice for each member of the six returnee 
households. Respondents said that the ministry 
had assured them they would provide more rice 
in later months, but this had not eventuated. The 
village chief of Caicua was eager to welcome the 
former residents, largely because the six families 
were related to him through marriage ties. He 
bought rice for the families and furthermore 
endorsed returnees to create Timor-Leste identity 
and electoral cards. While returnees were generally 
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disappointed that the state has not paid more 
attention to their immediate needs, particularly 
during food-insecure months, most returnees 
simply said, ‘if the state gives us help, we will 
receive. If it doesn’t, then it’s okay.’ In this sense, 
they exhibit the qualities of dignity (dignidade), 
self-respect and independence in securing 
themselves better livelihoods. A number of 
villagers who returned through their own means in 
earlier years similarly explained that they had not 
received any government social assistance. Instead, 
they primarily relied upon members of kin for 
support, especially during the initial period after 
their return.
4.4 Cross-border mobility
During the time that interviews were conducted, 
a number of relatives were visiting from Naibonat. 
At the same time, some residents from Caicua 
were away visiting the remaining family members 
in Naibonat. Between 30 to 60 former residents of 
Caicua remain in Indonesia. It is difficult to get an 
exact number since family members have married 
local residents in West Timor, or have married 
fellow Timorese who were also displaced in 1999. 
Alternatively, some family members have migrated 
elsewhere in Indonesia.
As described in case study three, thousands 
of former East Timorese refugees remain in West 
Timor. While many individuals and families have 
resettled permanently as Indonesian citizens, others 
are contemplating repatriation. There is a steady 
flow of people and goods across the border, legally 
and illegally, among these geographically extended 
families. The Joint Border Committee established 
between the two states has implemented a border 
crossing pass which permits free of charge border 
crossing for 10 days for residents in the recognised 
border zones to travel within the designated areas.20 
Those who do not reside in particular villages 
along the border require a passport and visa to 
move between countries. Former refugees and 
their families separated across borders beyond the 
recognised villages are not eligible for the scheme, 
which means that there is a tendency for people 
to resort to travelling through the ‘back roads’ or 
jalan tikus (‘rat trails’) to avoid paying visa fees.
Those who are travelling from Timor-Leste 
in particular typically do not have a passport and 
cannot afford visa fees. Consequently, they choose 
to trek through the forests, cross dry river beds, 
or bribe border patrol officers. One respondent 
explained that he even paid a fisherman to take 
him on a boat when the river was high, before 
continuing his journey by ojek (a motorcycle taxi) 
to Naibonat. Another male respondent who was 
a police officer during the Indonesian occupation 
said he was travelling to Kupang regularly to receive 
his pension up until 2011 when his Indonesian 
passport expired.
4.5 Conclusion
Versions of these experiences of flight, return and 
cross-border movement can be found elsewhere 
in Timor-Leste where individuals, families and 
communities continue to rebuild livelihoods and 
recover from forced displacement and conflict a 
decade after Timor-Leste achieved nationhood and 
statehood. The absence of official state assistance 
in repatriation efforts has been compensated for 
by NGOs and local kinship networks, which have 
given returnees the necessary resources to rebuild 
their lives.
Although East Timorese political leaders have 
publicly encouraged the return of the East Timorese 
refugee diaspora, they have not formally embarked 
on assisting voluntary repatriation of former 
refugees in Indonesia. The repatriation of former 
pro-integration leaders and militia members, 
particularly those who played a role in violence 
and criminal acts, presents a politically sensitive 
issue for Timor-Leste’s leaders. Indonesia and 
Timor-Leste recognise the high rates of mobility of 
people and goods associated with the longstanding 
cultural and trade links between the border areas. 
However, former refugees are excluded from formal 
bilateral border crossing agreements and must bear 
the brunt of first applying for a passport and then 
paying high visa fees.
As recommended in an International Crisis 
Group report (ICG 2011), the Timor-Leste 
Government could provide returnees basic social 
assistance for an interim period (or at least an 
agricultural cycle) upon their return to the origin 
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villages or resettlement elsewhere. Reconciliation 
efforts are best left to the local communities to 
carry out since there are wide variations in terms 
of violence committed during the 1999 conflict. 
High rates of mobility are involved in maintaining 
kinship ties and exchange relations between non-
returnees in Naibonat and the origin community. 
Hence, there needs to be recognition of, and 
allowances made for, diasporic communities such 
as Caicua.
In summary, the trend of small-scale, 
individual and household-level repatriation, 
through legal and illegal means, will likely 
continue for some years if Timor-Leste remains 
politically stable, and makes steady progress in 
key areas of social and economic development. In 
the meantime, the border between Indonesia and 
Timor-Leste remains porous as the East Timorese 
refugee diaspora seek the best path to secure 
stability in their lives.
Conclusion: Beyond the Conflict Paradigm: 
The Need for More Complex Narratives of 
Timor-Leste – Indonesia Relations
In very different ways, the four case studies 
discussed here illustrate the enduring but 
sometimes fraught nature of ties between Timor-
Leste and Indonesia. They show that, in terms 
of institutions, Indonesia continues to be a key 
influence on the development of Timor-Leste’s 
police force. They also demonstrate that, in the 
realm of everyday life, the influence of Indonesia is 
felt in myriad ways: displaced East Timorese living 
in West Timor continue to negotiate the political 
border between the two nations, or deal with the 
challenges of returning to their communities in 
Timor-Leste. Moreover, the lives of both East 
Timorese and Indonesians continue to be marked 
by the legacy of complex intimate relationships. 
Collectively, the case studies seem to suggest 
that Timor-Leste’s relationship with Indonesia is 
characterised not by ‘outright opposition’ but by 
more subtle forms of ambivalence and tension 
(Nygaard-Christensen 2013:424). Although 
influenced by history, this relationship is constantly 
evolving and is renegotiated both by political elites 
as well as ordinary people.
What might these insights suggest to academic 
researchers writing about, and policymakers 
working on, Timor-Leste? First and foremost, the 
case studies suggest the need to develop more 
complex narratives of Timor-Leste and Indonesia 
relations — accounts that move beyond the 
ahistorical ‘conflict paradigm’ and engage with the 
longstanding historical, cultural, social and political 
ties that exist between the two nations. Greater 
recognition of these ties might lead policymakers 
to eschew the idea that Timor-Leste is a post-
conflict tabula rasa in which key institutions have 
been developed from scratch, and accept that those 
institutions, including the ‘new’ police, have been 
significantly shaped by Indonesian experiences 
and practice. By developing a more historically 
grounded understanding of how Indonesia 
has influenced, and continues to influence, the 
formation and practice of key institutions, scholars 
and policymakers might gain more insight into how 
these institutions function in the present and how 
they might evolve in the future.
A more complex, multidimensional, narrative 
of Timor-Leste – Indonesia relations would also 
see academics and policymakers moving beyond 
the oft-repeated statement that ‘pragmatism’ lies at 
the heart of this relationship. While pragmatism is 
certainly a feature of bilateral diplomatic relations 
between the political leaders of the two nations, to 
stop with this observation does not do justice to the 
deep ties that exist at the level of everyday, ‘people-
to-people’ relations. Indeed, it is clear that, despite 
the violence of the occupation, most ordinary 
East Timorese do not display animosity towards 
Indonesians. It is common to hear East Timorese 
express the view that ‘we rejected the Indonesian 
military regime, not the Indonesian people’.
A focus on the everyday lives of East Timorese 
and their interactions with Indonesians, both 
historically and in the present, might lead to 
more nuanced understandings of how people 
conceptualise both the state and their national 
identity. As case studies three and four highlight, 
the geographic border between Indonesia and 
Timor-Leste is not as ‘fixed’ as it might appear, 
and many people continue to negotiate lives, 
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families and business in both countries. Greater 
recognition of this fluidity and movement could 
help to inform more flexible policy responses in 
relation to border policing, visas and the provision 
of basic social assistance that ease the burden on 
displaced East Timorese who decide to return 
to their country of origin. While case study 
two focuses on the experiences of a particularly 
marginalised group of East Timorese women, 
it nonetheless also complicates accounts of East 
Timorese national identity based upon East 
Timorese victimhood. While acknowledging that 
women who were coerced into sexual relationships 
with the Indonesian military during the occupation 
experienced violence, repression and victimisation, 
it also highlights their negotiation and survival 
skills. These skills, evinced by many East Timorese 
during the occupation, are perhaps also assisting 
people to rebuild their lives and negotiate complex, 
and at times seemingly contradictory, relationships 
with Indonesia in the post-independence era.
We would also venture so far as to suggest that 
it is too simplistic to characterise the relationship 
between political leaders in terms of good state-
to-state relations. Of course, it is undeniable that 
Indonesia is seeking to restore its reputation as a 
‘good’ international citizen in the aftermath of the 
occupation and to demonstrate that era reformasi 
is clearly underway, and that Timor-Leste’s policy 
of reconciliation is informed by the need to build 
relations with its large neighbour. Nonetheless, 
these relations, like those between ordinary people, 
are informed by deep historical and personal ties, 
as well as the begrudging respect that both the 
Indonesian military and FALINTIL developed 
during the occupation.
This is very much a new topic of research and 
further work is required to elaborate the extent of 
linkages, relationships and entanglements between 
Indonesia and Timor-Leste. One fruitful avenue 
of inquiry, as foreshadowed by the section on 
police, might explore the new alliances that are 
emerging between East Timorese political elites 
and Indonesian businessmen, and the role that 
Indonesian businessmen are playing in the shaping 
of post-independence Dili (see also Nygaard-
Christensen 2013:435). Research into how the 
new generation of young East Timorese studying 
in Indonesia engage with the legacies of the past 
in their attempts to forge their own relationships 
might also reveal valuable insights. Already, 
however, it would seem that, when transposed 
with the existing literature, exploring the influence 
of Indonesia may present a fuller picture to 
understanding ongoing processes of state and 
nation formation in contemporary Timor-Leste.
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Endnotes
1 These papers were presented at the Oceanscapes 
conference in Sydney in April 2014.
2 Written by Gordon Peake.
3 Written by Lia Kent.
4 Written by Andrey Damaledo.
5 Written by Pyone Myat Thu.
6 Locating Timor-Leste in the same bracket as 
countries such as South Sudan and Nepal, and 
apart from its neighbours, is a relatively new trend. 
Historians, anthropologists, botanists and geologists 
have long located the half-island within a broader 
Malay archipelago (Fox 1980), but scholars working 
on the country in the 2000s have tended to shy away 
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from emphasising one regional context. Ideological 
predilections may also play a part, whether 
subliminally or otherwise, in emphasising differences 
between Timor-Leste and Indonesia (Nygaard-
Christensen 2013).
7 During his 2005 address to the East Timorese 
parliament, the then Indonesian president stated 
that ‘the people of Timor-Leste have always been 
our close relatives’. He went on to say, ‘we are two 
nations and we are two states’, sending a clear message 
that territorial ambition is part of Indonesia’s story 
of the past and that the newly reformed Indonesia 
recognises and respects East Timor’s sovereignty.
8 During his visit to Indonesia in May 2008, for 
instance, following the conclusion of the bilateral 
‘Truth and Friendship Commission’, Prime Minister 
Xanana Gusmao stated: ‘Our future relations must 
be built around a strong partnership that promotes 
peace and security, as well as new opportunities for 
prosperity, freedom, justice, tolerance and democracy 
for our neighbouring and friendly countries … Let 
us reinvent new partnerships, formulating serious 
cooperation proposals, as a way to defend the 
freedom of our brother countries … Our common 
history is made by our two peoples. Let us create the 
conditions for friendship and solidarity among them 
to grow stronger and stronger’ (Gusmao 2008:6–12).
9 An important exception to this trend is the work of 
Bu Wilson (2010), who frames her doctoral thesis on 
the origins of the East Timorese police in terms of 
Portuguese and Indonesian antecedents.
10 Blunt spent time in Dili working inside the East 
Timorese Government.
11 The CAVR (2005) report provides the most 
comprehensive accounts of these experiences (see 
especially Chapter 7.7). As part of its nationwide 
truth-seeking process, it documents 853 cases of 
sexual violence against women, 229 of which were 
cases of what the commission termed ‘sexual slavery’.
12 The study was undertaken in collaboration with a 
team of East Timorese women researchers from the 
Timor-Leste office of the International Center for 
Transitional Justice (ICTJ) and the Alola Foundation. 
Nineteen women from the districts of Aileu, Ainaro, 
Los Palos and Baucau were interviewed about their 
lives. All interviews were conducted via existing 
contacts of the ICTJ. The study was exploratory in 
nature; it sought to open up discussion and deepen 
understandings of an underexplored issue, rather 
than provide a comprehensive account of women’s 
experiences. Interviews were sought not so much 
to document an objective ‘truth’ but to gain an 
understanding of the meanings women ascribed to 
their experiences and how they sought to rebuild 
their lives. For a fuller account of the project findings 
see Kent (2014).
13 The term ‘comfort woman’ refers to the thousands of 
young women and girls who were pressed into sexual 
servitude during the Asia–Pacific War.
14 In the most extreme case encountered by the research 
team, a woman in Los Palos was found to have 
endured a coercive sexual relationship with a military 
officer followed by a policeman, for a period of 
nine years.
15 The Bolsu de Maie (mothers pocket) scheme, 
introduced in 2008 to assist the neediest female-
headed households, provides a monthly subsidy of 
between US$5 and US$30 for each child to assist in 
the education of children.
16 This paper is based on my ethnographic research 
among the East Timorese in West Timor between 
October 2012 and October 2013. This analysis on 
the Tetun people would not be possible without the 
support of my good kolega Nato Moreira who has 
shared not only his companionship, knowledge and 
networks, but also his accommodation during my 
stay in Betun. I would also like to acknowledge the 
contribution of my good friend Olyvianus Dadi Lado 
in sharing the stories of Sukabiwedik people in his 
inspirational but unfortunately short-lived Loro Sae 
Li’an bulletin.
17 Properly it was referred to as Wewiku-Wehali or 
Wesei-Wehali. I choose to use Wehali as a shorthand.
18 I am extremely grateful to Fila Hikas Knua for giving 
me the opportunity to observe and participate in the 
repatriation process, in particular Charles Meluk for 
providing research assistance in Caicua.
19 There are further East Timorese who are returning 
or have returned illegally, and their numbers are 
unrecorded.
20 See Arrangement between the Republic of Indonesia 
and the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste on 
Traditional Border Crossings and Regulated Markets, 
<http://treaty.kemlu.go.id/uploads-pub/4284_TLS-
2003-0003.pdf>, viewed 2/12/2014.
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